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ABSTRACT
This study tests two major prescriptions of Staw and Ross about the management of escalation
behavior in organizations. Since these prescriptions are primarily based on research using students in
controlled settings, the efficacy of the prescriptions was tested in the context of a real, functioning
organization. The results provide conditional support for separating initial decision responsibility from
subsequent responsibility as a means of reducing escalation behavior. However, the findings did not
support a reduction of project failure risk as a means of minimizing escalation of commitment to a
failing course of action.
Subject Areas: Decision Processes and Organizational Behavior.

INTRODUCTION

Escalation of commitment is defined as a decision maker's continued commit
ment to a specific course of action despite information that suggests the course
of action is failing. Beginning with Staw's seminal article [14], the phenomenon
has attracted a great deal of attention [I] [2] [3] [14] [15] [16] [17] because decision
makers who escalate are presumed to be adopting an economically irrational course.
Decision makers have been shown to invest more money and assume greater risks
in a chosen course of action despite the presence of evidence indicating that con
tinued commitment to that course is unwise.
The reason why decision makers escalate has to do with the psychological mech
anism of commitment [Il]. Commitment is defined as an individual's adoption
of a stance of belief in the appropriateness of a course of action. This stance of
belief may be subject to the decision maker's motivation to self-justify [6], to justify
him/herself to others [5], and/or to be behaviorally consistent [18]. Thus, econom
ically irrational behavior is continued because the decision maker believes that the
social/psychological benefits of continuing in terms of self-image, reputation, face
saving, and role performance outweigh the costs. Note that commitment here refers
to persistence in any failing course of action and so it is a more generalized notion
than, for example, job commitment. However, escalation can develop in a job
commitment decision [9] [12].
Nonetheless, Staw and Ross [17] recognized the clear and important impli
cations that escalation of commitment has for decision making in organizations.
*The authors would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers whose comments on earlier
drafts led to substantial improvements in this manuscript.
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As a result of extant research, they prescribed actions to reduce or eliminate deci
sion makers' tendency to escalate. This paper describes a test of two of Staw and
Ross's prescriptions and discusses the implications for managing escalation behavior
in organizations.
Staw and Ross proposed to reduce escalation first by removing a sense of
responsibility from decision makers. This recommendation was based on research
that indicated only those responsible for an initial course of action were likely to
escalate [1] [2] [3] [4] [14] [15] [16] [17]. Thus, Staw and Ross [17] recommended
(1) periodic replacement of original decision makers in the middle of a project
with different administrators who were not responsible for the original commit
ment or (2) use of separate decision makers for initial and subsequent decisions
on a project. Certainly both methods are potentially disruptive but disruption might
be preferable to escalation.
The second recommendation is based on the belief that decision makers tend
to remain committed to a course of action when the perceived cost of failure is high
[1] [10] and refers to the guaranteed failure of the project due to withdrawal. For
example, if the decision maker perceives that failure on a project may adversely
affect his/her career with the firm, he/she may feel forced to continue a losing
course of action because the action's eventual (hoped for) success may be perceived
as the only viable option. To counteract this tendency, Staw and Ross suggested that
management should reduce the perceived risk of guaranteed project failure due
to withdrawal [17]. Specifically, they recommended rationalizing failed decisions·
to lessen the perceived impact on the decision maker. Rationalization in this case
means telling the decision maker that the initial decision was a good one at the time
even if it has turned out badly. As Staw and Ross pointed out, the organization
must distinguish between the competent manager who has erred and the incompe
tent manager. For the generally competent manager, rationalizing the error means
giving feedback to the decision maker to reduce the perceived risk associated with
project failure. This suggestion is consistent with results from numerous studies
that indicate the form of feedback is important for successful performance [7].
The last prescription is based on the belief that negative information about
the status of a project is filtered as it progresses up the organizational hierarchy. As
Staw and Ross suggested, "no one wants to be the conveyor of bad news ... [and]
those intimately involved with a project are not likely to distribute unflattering
and less-than-optimistic forecasts" [17, p. 73]. Yet they pointed out that studies
have shown a tendency not to escalate if decision makers are made aware of the
true costs. Accordingly, Staw and Ross recommended enacting systems to reward
honest reporting as much as successful outcomes to assure accurate data are used
when evaluating project status.
Because of the potential influence of these prescriptions on managers who wish
to manage escalation behavior in their organizations, it is important to test these
recommendations to assess their efficacy. Further, because these recommendations
are based primarily on laboratory studies using student subjects [3] [17], empirical
validation of the prescriptions on a sample of practicing managers is particularly
important.
Consequently, the objective of this study is to evaluate empirically the first
two of these prescriptions using a sample of experienced managers. Note that the
third prescription is not tested in this study, as it involves influencing the actions
of the entire information system of an organization as opposed to the actions of
an individual decision maker. This point is discussed further in the following section.
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THE STUDY APPROACH

In order to achieve the research objective, the present study establishes a context
in which an initial decision is failing and the decision maker must decide whether
or not to continue that course of action. The research leading to the first prescrip
tion of Staw and Ross [17] discussed above indicates that responsibility for the
initial decision is an important factor. Decision makers who are responsible for
initiating a course of action tend to stay committed to that course of action [1] [2]
[4] [14] [15] [17], although this is not inevitable [3] [10] [6].
Accordingly, responsibility for the initial decision is included as a factor in
this study (see the next section for a description of the specific manipulation). Note
that this study uses the specific approach of replacing decision makers in mid
project to achieve the decoupling of initial and subsequent decision responsibility.
However, the basic issue is whether the decision maker is or is not responsible for
the initial decision, regardless of the approach used as the basis for experimental
manipulation.
In addition to initial responsibility, the present study also manipulates the
context within which the decision to escalate or withdraw is made by altering the
evaluative feedback provided to participants. The intent of this manipulation is
to vary the risk of project failure perceived by the decision maker in escalating
commitment (as recommended by Staw and Ross [17] in their second prescription).
While the specific feedback manipulation is described later, it is important
to explain the basis for the particular approach used to operationalize the feed
back and the evaluative context it is intended to create. Staw and Ross suggested
that the organization must lessen a project's "risk of failure" to reduce escalation
behavior. As Hedberg and Jonsson [6] pointed out, risk involves uncertainty (Le.,
probability of various outcomes) times the stakes (Le., what may be gained or lost)
associated with the possible outcomes. Staw and Ross specifically suggested a mod
ification of the decision maker's perception of the personal stakes associated with
a failed project. As Staw and Ross implied, if the manager feels his/her competence
is in question as a result of negative feedback, he/she may see no other recourse
but to try to make the situation successful by continuing to commit resources.
Modification of the perception of risk in a decision situation essentially involves
modifying the context or frame in which the decision is presented. Kahneman and
1\rersky [8] proposed that inconsistencies in risk preference could result from
different formulations of the risk involved. That is, the way a decision is worded
or presented influences the evaluation of alternatives and thereby affects choice.
Brockner and Rubin [3] pointed out that decision makers in a failing course
of action are faced with the prospect of accepting a sure loss (by not investing
further) or trying to recoup the investment (by allocating more resources). Consistent
with the predictions of Staw and Ross, this prospect theory predicts decision makers
will choose the latter, more risky option and thus escalate. Brockner and Rubin
further pointed out that this choice behavior contradicts reinforcement theory
predictions which suggest that feedback framed positively (or less negatively) leads
to further commitment (escalation).
.
Therefore, to achieve variation of this framing effect when conditions deter
iorate, the situation is rationalized using one of two types of feedback. With posi
tive feedback, the initial decision is reasonable under the circumstances (which
implies that the initial decision does not represent poor judgment on the part of
the decision maker). With negative feedback, the initial decision is fundamentally
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flawed (which implies poor judgment on the part of the decision maker). The manip
ulation is intended to vary the perceived personal stakes of failure by using different
frames of evaluative feedback. The manipulation is checked by asking subjects their
perception of risk associated with additional funding. Since the uncertainty (prob
ability) of project failure and the monetary stakes (i.e., specific dollar loss/gain)
are held constant in the experiment, any systematic difference in perceived project
risk represents the difference in personal stakes as perceived by the subject and
thereby demonstrates a framing effect.
The last prescription (i.e., assuring that the actual progress of the project!
decision is represented in the information available for subsequent decision making)
is addressed by the use of specific, fact-based scenarios that give the decision maker
accurate information about the situation. The assumption used here is that accurate
information must always be superior to biased or erroneous information for deci
sion making. Staw and Ross's prescription was designed to assure the availability
of accurate information to the decision maker. Since this study involves only the
decision maker and not his/her informational system, it is not possible to include
a factor to test a reward system to assure accurate information is available. This
factor is therefore held constant in the experiment.
Although Staw and Ross [17] did not specifically address the relationship
among responsibility, evaluative context, and accurate information factors, their
prescriptions imply an additive relationship. In other words, for optimal reduc
tion of escalation behavior in an organization, all basic prescriptions can be used
simultaneously (i.e., decoupling initial and subsequent responsibility, rationalizing
poor results from initial decisions, and assuring accurate information for decision
making).
Thus, based on the prescriptions of Staw and Ross [17], the following are
expected to be valid.
1. Those not responsible for an initial decision are less likely to stay committed
to a failing course of action than those responsible for the initial deci
sion, regardless of the evaluative feedback framing.
2. Those subjects who receive rationalizations (positively framed feedback)
of poor initial results for a failing project are less likely to stay committed
to a failing course of action than those who receive negative feedback,
regardless of their responsibility for the initial decision.
The expected relationships are graphically portrayed in Figure 1. Because
information accuracy is held constant in this experiment, it is not included in the
hypotheses or in the figure.

METHOD
A total of 123 employees with managerial experience in a high technology,
international engineering firm participated in the experiment. Subjects on average
were 34.1 years of age, employed by the company for 5.3 years, have held their
present job 3.7 years, and supervised 2.7 subordinates. Sixty subjects held a
bachelor's degree, 56 held a master's degree, and 7 held a Ph.D. degree. Subjects
represented both administrative (i.e., corporate and financial staff) and technical
personnel (e.g., sales, engineering), although technical personnel represented about
70 percent of the sample. Both males (n =106) and females (n =13) were included
in the sample (gender data were not available for four subjects). Subjects represented
different nationalities including Japanese, English, German, French, Italian, and
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Figure 1: Hypothesized relationship of responsibility for initial resource alloca
tion and evaluative context based on prescriptions of Staw and Ross [17].
Escalation
of

Comm I tment

Responsible

Not Responsible

Negative

Positive

Evaluative Context

Swedish, although most of the subjects (70 percent of the sample) were citizens
of the United States. In addition, 65 percent of the sample worked in the United
States, while 35 percent worked overseas.
Although subjects were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions listed
below, there was some concern that an unintended language/cultural bias could
confound results. The responses of nonnative Americans to all the variables
described below were tested against the responses of Americans. No differences
were found so the multinational sample was used intact.
Procedure

Subjects read an investment scenario (a situation depicting events that might
reasonably occur in their organization), made several decisions, and then responded
to questions about their behavior and attitudes.
In order to make the investment scenario as realistic as possible, it was designed
with the help of the firm's management and incorporated a typical investment
situation faced by employees of the firm. In addition, language and procedures
idiosyncratic to the firm were incorporated to insure subject familiarity with, as
well as interest in, the decision situation described.
Subjects were instructed to assume the role of general manager of an actual
division in the firm. They were also told that the firm typically allocated approx
imately 10 percent of expected sales for expenses associated with securing those
sales. Six months ago a client was targeted and $100,000 was authorized for demon
strations and support personnel costs because a sale of $1 million was anticipated.
To date, some $60,000 of the allocation has been spent but it appears the sale will
go to a competitor.
Manipulations

Responsibility manipulation. Half the subjects were told that they had made
the initial authorization for allocation of expenses ("responsible" condition) and
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half the subjects were told that their predecessor had made the initial authoriza
tion ("not responsible" condition). Note that subjects did not actually make the
initial authorization but were told to assume that they had done so. Bazerman,
Giuliano, and Appelman [2] successfully manipulated responsibility for a previous
decision using a similar approach.
Context manipulation. The framing of context manipulation was intended to
affect the decision maker's attitude regarding the risk of failure of the project.
Based on the prescription of Staw and Ross [17], half the subjects received a posi
tively framed context in which they were told that even though the client was likely
to buy from a competitor, they (or their predecessor in the "not responsible" condi
tion) had exercised good judgment and only spent $60,000. There was, however,
a possibility that the sale could still be made. Half the subjects received a neg
atively framed context in which they were told that the client was likely to buy from
a competitor, that this could be viewed as a disaster, and that they (or their pred
ecessor in the "not responsible" condition) had exercised poor judgment for losing
$60,000. There was, however, a possibility that the sale could still be made.
The manipulations created a 2 X 2 design in which two levels of responsibility
(responsible and not responsible for initial authorization) are crossed with two levels
of context (feedback) framing (positive and negative). Subjects were randomly
assigned to the experimental conditions to control for systematic differences in the
groups that might influence their escalation behavior. Cell sizes ranged from 28
to 31.
Dependent Measures

Two dependent measures were employed in the experiment. In the first, subjects
could select one of two decision options: (I) invest no further or (2) risk the
remaining $40,000 with the knowledge that there was a 20 percent chance of success
and an 80 percent chance of losing the entire $100,000. These options were worded
consistently with the subject's context frame condition. Thus, in the positive context
frame subjects were presented with the following:
Please indicate your decision below by circling the desired response. You should
use your own judgment and experience.
\. Save the remaining $40,000 by not continuing to invest in this firm.
2. Risk the remaining $40,000 with a 20 percent chance of earning the entire
$100,000 back from the proceeds of the sale and an 80 percent chance of
gaining nothing from the original $100,000.

Negative context frame subjects were presented with the following:
Please indicate your decision below by circling the desired response. You should
use your own judgment and experience.
\. Accept a loss of $60,000 by not continuing to invest in this firm.
2. Risk the remaining $40,000 with an 80 percent chance of losing the entire
$100,000 and a 20 percent chance of losing $0 (i.e., break even from the
proceeds of the sale).
It is important to note that the wording for these choices is based on scenarios

reported by Brockner and Rubin [3]. Because the scenarios depict a losing course
of action, it is problematic to provide "positive" feedback. As a result, "positive"
feedback is actually "less negative" than "negative" feedback. As Brockner and
Rubin [3] noted, this kind of wording is consistent with the framing effects posited
by the prospect theory and by Staw and Ross [17].
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It is also important to note that subjects in both context conditions were
presented with mathematically equivalent choices. Further, these decision options
were constructed so that the expected value of the loss from the gamble was con
siderably more than the value of the certain loss. For example, in this study the
expected value of the continued investment option is -$80,000 (Le., (.2)($0.0)+
(.8)(-$100,000», while the value of the withdrawal option is a certain -$60,000.
This was done to assure that the decision for continued commitment (or escalation)
was clearly riskier than the decision to withdraw. Thus, a decision to commit addi
tional resources under these circumstances would represent irrational (risk-seeking)
behavior consistent with the concept of escalation of commitment to a failing course
of action.
A second dependent measure was employed that required subjects to specify the
probability of regaining the initial investment, which would induce her/him to
continue to invest (Le., take the gamble). As noted above, the language used to por
tray the second dependent variable was consistent with the subject's context frame.
If the chance of Company XXX gaining (losing) the sale after expenditure of the

additional $40,000 was 99 out of 100, you would probably recommend (not)
spending the additional funds. Conversely, if the chance of gaining (losing) the
sale was only 1 in 100 you would probably not ("not" deleted in negative context)
recommend spending the extra money. As XXX's chance of gaining (losing) the
sale was increased (decreased) from 1 percent (99 percent) there would be a point
at which you would recommend spending the additional sales resources. In other
words, what is the lowest (highest) chance of XXX gaining (losing) the sale that
would prompt you to spend the additional resources?
_ _ _ percent
Or, check one of the following:
(a) Would not recommend spending the added resources, no matter what the
chance of gain (loss).
(b) Would recommend spending the added resources, no matter what the chance
of gain (loss).

Because this dependent variable allowed subjects to select a specific level of
uncertainty necessary for their continued commitment rather than a given level (as
with the previous dependent measure), the magnitude of the subject's risk-taking
behavior could be assessed. Further, as a follow-up measure it provided a consis
tency check on the first dependent measure.
After making the decisions, subjects completed several questions containing
Likert-type rating scales to assess the effects of the responsibility and context
framing. In addition, subjects indicated how important they thought the decision
was (1 = not very important, 5= very important) and whether they thought respon
sibility for the success of the account was out of their control (= 1) or in their hands
(=7).

RESULTS
The responsibility manipulation was checked by asking subjects how responsible
they felt for the initial authorization. They indicated their degree of responsibility
on a five-point scale (1=not very responsible, 5=very responsible). The mean
response of those in the' 'responsible" condition was 4.4 (standard deviation =.76),
while the mean response of those in the "not responsible" condition was 2.2 (stan
dard deviation = 1.28). These means are significantly different (F= 124.82, p < .001).
The 2 x 2 design allows comparison of those subjects' feelings of responsibility
who had different evaluative contexts as well as those with different responsibility
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manipulations. Therefore, the data were checked for both interactive and main
effects of context. Neither the main effect of context nor the interaction of respon
sibility and context were significant. This suggests that context (feedback) does not
affect the subjects' feelings of responsibility. Thus, as intended, those in the
"responsible" condition reported feeling responsible for the initial authorization,
while those in the "not responsible" condition reported otherwise.
The context (feedback) manipulation was checked by asking the subjects two
questions. First they were asked to indicate the level of risk they felt was assoc
iated with investing additional funding. As discussed above, this question was
intended to assess differences in perceived personal stakes associated with addi
tional funding. They indicated the degree of risk they perceived on a five-point
scale (l =no risk, 5 =too risky).
Analysis of these data reveals a significant overall effect (F=7.54, p<.OOI,
R 2 = .16), a significant main effect for context (F= 18.10, p < .001), and a signif
icant responsibility times context interaction (F=4.48, p < .05). The form of this
interaction is shown in Figure 2. A simple effects test within levels of responsibility
revealed significant differences of context within the "responsible" condition
(F=21.39, p < .001) but not within the "not responsible" condition. Responsible
subjects in the negative context reported they perceived more risk associated with
further allocation than did subjects in the positive context. This result suggests that
the prescription for reducing risk recommended by Staw and Ross [17] has the
desired effect on those decision makers responsible for an initial commitment of
resources but no effect on the risk perceptions of persons new to the project or
initially not responsible. This outcome is important to the interpretation of the
results presented below.
In addition to the perception of risk, context was checked by asking subjects
how disappointed they were in their present condition. Because the initial decision
was producing negative results, all subjects were expected to be disappointed to
some extent. Subjects in the positive context (i.e., the decision did not work out
Figure 2: Interaction of responsibility and information content when level of
perceived risk of project continuation is used as dependent variable (cell means
are in parentheses).
5

Perceived
Risk

Responsible

4

(3.8)
(3.6)

Not Responsible
(3.3)

3

Negative

Positive

Information Content
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but judgment was good) were expected to be less disappointed with the present
condition than those in the negative context (i.e., the initial decision could be viewed
as a disaster). The subjects indicated their degree of disappointment on a five
point scale (1 =not too disappointed, 5 = very disappointed). The mean response
of those in the positive context was 3.6 (standard deviation = .94), while the mean
response of those in the negative context was 4.1 (standard deviation = 1.02). These
means are significantly different (F= 10.56, P < .01). There is no main effect for
responsibility nor a significant interaction. This result suggests that subjects in the
negative context manipulation were more disappointed in the initial outcome of
the decision, regardless of responsibility for the initial decision.
In addition to the manipulation check questions noted above, subjects were
also asked two follow-up questions. First they were asked how important they
thought the decision in the scenario was (1 =not very important, 5= very impor
tant) and then were asked whether they thought the responsibility (now) for the
success of the account they were handling was out of their control (= 1) or in their
own hands (= 7). Variance in the responses to these questions was not significantly
different due to responsibility and context factors. For the question about degree
of importance, the mean response of all subjects was 4.14 (standard deviation = .75).
For the question of degree of control, the mean response of all subjects was 5.13
(standard deviation = 1.26). Thus, subjects reported that the decision was impor
tant and responsibility for success was in their own hands, not out of their control.
This is additional confirmation that the subjects took the exercise seriously.
OVERALL ANALYSIS

The first dependent variable required subjects to indicate whether they would
withdraw from the project or continue to invest. Table 1 reports the result of chi
square tests to determine whether the frequency of these choices differed among
the four treatment groups. The results suggest a significant difference among cells
in the "responsible condition (X:'=8.06, df=3, p<.05) but not in the "not respons
ible" condition. A review of Thble 1 suggests that subjects in the "responsible
positive" context cell appear to be most willing to escalate, while subjects in the
"responsible-negative" context cell appear least willing to escalate.
Thble 2 reports the mean probabilities of regaining the initial investment that
would induce subjects to continue to invest. Note that for subjects in the negative
Table 1: Observed frequencies of subject choices in each experimental condition.
H.

Negative Content

Positive Content

20
9

10
21

15
15

17

Responsible condition

Number choosing to:
Withdraw
Continue to invest
Note: x2 =8.06, df=3, p<.05.
b. Not responsible condition
Number choosing to:
Withdraw
Continue to invest
Note: ~=.70, df=3, p is not significant.

Note: Five subjects did not provide responses.

II
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Table 2: Mean probability of regaining initial investment and thus inducing subjects
to continue to invest.
Responsibility
Responsible
Not responsible

Positive
29.1
(22.4)

Information Content
Negative
48.6
(21.2)

40.9
(22.7)

39.6
(21.9)

Marginal Means
38.9
40.3

35
44.1
Marginal means
Note: A lower number indicates a lower probability of success and is therefore indicative of risk
seeking (i.e., inclination to escalate). Standard deviations are in parentheses.

context the appropriate probability is 1 minus the probability percentage they
recorded in their response to the second dependent measure. Conversely, for posi
tive context subjects, the probability percentage used is the same as the probability
they recorded. A lower number indicates a willingness to accept a smaller chance
of success, which in this experiment indicates a stronger commitment to continue.
A 2 x 2 ANOVA used to test these means reveals a significant overall relationship
(F=3.46, p <.05, R 2 = .09), a significant main effect for context (F=4.52, p<.05),
and a significant interaction between responsibility and context (F= 5.88, P < .05).
The form of this interaction is depicted in Figure 3. According to these data, the
influence of a context effect depends on whether or not subjects were responsible
for the initial authorization of funds.
A simple effects test within responsibility levels revealed significant differ
ences for context within the "responsible" condition (F= 10.39, P < .01) but not
within the "not responsible" condition. Responsible condition subjects in the posi
tive context require a lower probability of success in order to continue investing
than do responsible subjects in the negative context (i.e., the positive context subjects
are more willing to continue to invest or escalate).
The pattern of the means shown in Thbles 1 and 2 for both dependent var
iables indicates that subjects were consistent in their choices. In both cases subjects
in the responsible-positive context cell were the most willing to continue invest
ment, while subjects in the responsible-negative context were the least willing to
continue.
Although the focus of the analysis of the second dependent variable is on proba
bility assessment, subjects could choose to either recommend or reject spending
additional resources no matter what the chance of gain (loss). Note that choosing
to reject such expense is essentially a choice for withdrawal, while choosing to recom
mend it is a choice for further commitment. Eighteen subjects chose one of these
options rather than make a probability assessment. The expected frequencies for
the cells are not large enough to permit chi-square analysis; however, 14 subjects
chose to continue no matter what, and 9 of these 14 were in the positive context
condition. This pattern generally conforms to that shown in Tables 1 and 2.
DISCUSSION

The purpose of this paper was to test two of Staw and Ross's [17] prescrip
tions for managing escalation of commitment behavior in a real organization setting.
What was found sheds new and unexpected light on the effects of these prescrip
tions. In brief, Staw and Ross's recommendations to decouple responsibility for
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Figure 3: Interaction of responsibility and information content when probability
of successfully regaining initial investment is used as dependent variable.
Probab I I I ty
of Success

.50

Responsible

Not Responsible
.40

.30

Negative

Positive

Information Content

Note: Lower probability values indicate higher risk-taking behavior, that is, a stronger
inclination to escalate.

initial and subsequent decisions in a failing situation to reduce escalation behavior
was supported, but only conditionally. The data in the present study reveal an inter
active relationship between responsibility and context such that decision makers
who were responsible for an initial decision and received feedback in a positive
context were most inclined to escalate commitment, while those who were initially
responsible and received negative feedback were least likely to escalate (see Figure 3).
Staw and Ross also suggest that rationalization of a disappointing outcome
will reduce the perception of the project's risk of failure, thus allowing the deci
sion maker to make a more "rational" (nonescalative) decision. A review of Figure
2 suggests that such a positive feedback context does indeed reduce perception of
risk, but at least in this study it does so only for those decision makers responsible
for the initial decision. More importantly, unlike the implied prediction of Staw
and Ross, this reduction in risk perception resulted in more escalation, not less.
One possible reason for these surprising results may be found by comparing
Figures 2 and 3. It appears that the tendency to escalate is inversely related to the
amount of risk perceived by the decision maker in continuing a commitment. Since
the groups were randomly assigned a priori, it can be assumed that the risk propen
sities of the individuals were roughly the same among groups. This suggests the
amount of risk perceived by the subjects may be more important to escalation
behavior than feelings of responsibility or disappointment. This seems to make
sense from a strictly intuitive point of view. For example, if two people with the
same risk propensity have different views of the "riskiness" of a gamble, it seems
logical that the one who perceives less risk in the act will tend to gamble before
the other. If indeed the underlying driving mechanism of the decision maker is
perceived riskiness of continuing, these results are consistent with that explanation.
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It is also possible that the use of real organizational decision makers confronted
with a familiar, realistic scenario accounts for the results in the present study. Such
subjects have more experience with decision making in the circumstances captured
in this scenario than student subjects making more abstract decisions. Because our
subjects were all from the same organization, there may have been an organiza
tional culture bias affecting escalation behavior. Additional studies are necessary
to examine these questions and to generalize results to other organizational settings.

Managerial Implications

Managing or influencing a situation that could lead to escalation behavior is
certainly of interest to practicing managers. The data in the present study provide
additional insight into Staw and Ross's [17] prescriptions for doing so. For example,
Staw and Ross recommend either replacing managers in mid-project or having
different managers make initial and later decisions. The idea behind this recom
mendation is that only those responsible for the initial decision are likely to escalate.
Our data, however, indicate that even those responsible for the initial decision will
be disinclined to escalate if they receive negatively framed feedback about the
project.
Therefore, replacing managers or even having different managers make
different decisions about the project not only disrupts managerial continuity but
also may not be justified to prevent escalation, especially if the organization tends
to place blame on the decision maker (negative evaluative context) and does not
rationalize disappointing results (positive evaluative feedback).
Staw and Ross [17] also suggested rationalizing the failing course of action in
order to reduce the decision maker's perception of risk in the situation. However,
the results of this study suggest that rationalization of bad outcomes does reduce
the perception of risk but such rationalization tends to motivate the decision maker
to persist instead of freeing him/her from a need to persist. Therefore, reducing
the decision maker's perception of risk of project failure by whatever means does
not appear to be desirable for reducing escalation behavior.
In summary, to reduce the tendency for escalation in an actual organization
setting, the results of this study suggest it is advantageous to retain the original
decision makers while raising the perception of project risk by negatively framing
disappointing intermediate outcomes. Additionally, if personnel are changed in
mid-project, the nature of evaluative feedback appears to have virtually no effect
on subsequent escalation behavior. [Received: October 23, 1987. Accepted: June
21, 1988.]
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